



#:whoami?

- Known as 'isox'
- Web penetration tester
- QIWI CTO/CISO
- Member of "hall-of-fames" (Yandex, Mail.ru, Apple, and so on)
- JBFC participant ^____^



Captain obvious

- Penetration testing
- Just a way to check your security controls
- "Fast and dirty assessment"
- Performed by qualified specialists
- Part of PCI DSS certification as example
- Independent security review
- Need2do for security-aware companies



Traditional approach

- Single team (2-5 members)
- External, Internal and social-technology
- Restricted vectors and scenario
- Attackers whitelist
- No private information about a target
- Social attacks are often prohibited
- Limited attacks daytime



Pentester point of view

- Target-independent work scenario
- 1/3 time for well known vectors
- 1/3 time for new research
- 1/3 time for automated scanners
- No physical security bypass
- Limited social attacks
- Same story every time



Red team exercise

- They call it "Red-team":
 - Security team is not notified
 - Trying to simulate "real" attack
 - Still a lot of restrictions and limits
 - One team
 - No information about the internals



Anyway cover is not enough

- Blind zones
- Time limits
- Does not use all available vectors
- Too much accurate and ethic
- Does not really looks like real hackers attack
- Pentest team insufficient resources



Hack me plz!

- Lets make a big (dream?) team
- Let them work on their own!
- No more "secret pentest technique"
- Forget "don't attack that" and "don't bruteforce us after 6PM"
- Scope = everything
 - Not kidding. Really everything.
- No preparations from security team



No restrictions

- Social attacks
- Malware
- Account bruteforce
- Odays
- Night/weekend attacks
- Physical penetration
- DOS
- Drop-devices
- Personal devices hijack
- Employee bribe



Let's there be insider

- Sharing private information
- Network map
- Critical assets
- Security specialist as insider
- Hints and advises



Deep penetration

- Physical security bypass
- Drop-devices:
 - Wi-Fi and LAN back connects
 - Cable manipulations
 - USB Flash with malware
- Live social engineering
- Stealing laptops/pads/phones



Security reactions

- Security team awareness check
- Real incident investigation
- Bans and account lockouts
- Live system tuning
- Cooperation with physical security
- Logs, cameras, events and a lot of fun!



Challenge and goals

- For penetration team:
 - Application or SYS account for DB
 - AD enterprise administrator account
 - *nix root / admin account
 - Access to any critical system
- For security team:
 - Defend your home

And there is only one rule: no rules



QIWI Red Team Exercise

- Attackers: #ONSEC & #DSEC
- Defenders: #QIWI security team
- Insider: CISO (me)
- Timeline: 2.5 month
- Attack Goal:
 - SYSDBA, root, Enterprise Administrator
- Security team goal:
 - Notice at least 90% attacks and intrusions
 - Defend



Weeks of pain

- 7 social attacks in 2 weeks
- Few times of "emergency"
- System crashes
- Ordinary users butthurt:
 - Locked accounts
 - Spam/phishing emails
 - Viruses
- Malware investigations




Really cool vectors

- Successful office building intrusion
- Wi-Fi'ed and LAN'ed laptops gateways
- Mac OS X domain issues
- Smart House hacking
- Power Supply takeover
- Compiling dsniff for DVR

... even more in @d0znpp presentations



Some memos





And we lost this game

- System accounts were compromised
- Social engineering as a best attack vector
- SSH access to security team member's Macbook
- Downloaded dumps of network devices with password hashes
- Tons of successful brutes



Successful vector

- Gained credentials using social engineering
- Loss of isolation in guest Wi-Fi network
- Laptops, connected both to cable networks and Wi-Fi
- Bad MacOS active directory configuration, allowing any AD account to connect using SSH
- Keeping sensitive data plaintext in ~/
- Insufficient monitoring of the office traffic



Results

- Better than one-team classics
- Simulate near real hacker attacks
- Excellent scope fulfill
- Testing security as it is, not as it wants to be
- You will be disappointed in your security toys
- 'Little' bit expensive
- Systems will crash sometimes



See ya!

- Thanks to @videns for a good trip to the Troopers
- Thanks to #DSEC and #ONSEC for a great job
- Excuses to my security team for this two and a half months of hell

- Any questions?
- Contact: isox@qiwi.com