

Secure Systems and Pwning Popular Platforms

Modern Binary Exploitation

CSCI 4968 - Spring 2015

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```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_313067: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Lecture Overview

- Secure Systems & Patch Sets
 - OpenBSD
 - SELinux
 - Grsecurity
- Owning Game Consoles
 - Xbox 360
 - Nintendo 3DS
 - PS3
- Current Generation

```
push    edi
call   sub_314623
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz   short loc_313066
mov    eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp    eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb     short loc_313066
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]
push   esi
push   esi
push   eax
push   edi
mov    [ebp+arg_0], eax
call   sub_31486A
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
push   esi
lea   eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push   eax
mov    esi, 1D0h
push   esi
push   [ebp+arg_4]
push   edi
call   sub_314623
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz     short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push   0Dh
call   sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call   sub_3140F3
test   eax, eax
jg     short loc_31307D
call   sub_3140F3
jmp    short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call   sub_3140F3
and    eax, 0FFFFh
or     eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
```

OpenBSD




“The OpenBSD project produces a **FREE**, multi-platform 4.4BSD-based UNIX-like operating system. Our efforts emphasize portability, standardization, correctness, proactive security and integrated cryptography.”

–openbsd.org

OpenBSD

- Started in 1995 forking from NetBSD 1.0
- “Try to be the #1 most secure operating system” –openbsd.org



OpenBSD – Added Technologies

- Adds hardening & security technologies
 - W^X
 - Privilege isolation
 - Jails
 - Randomized malloc/mmap
 - Ships Crypto
 - A few other things

```
push    edi
call   sub_314623
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jz     short loc_313066
mov    eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp    [ebp+var_84], eax
jb     short loc_313066
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]
push   esi
push   esi
push   eax
push   edi
call   sub_314623
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
push   esi
lea   eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push   eax
mov   esi, 1D0h
push   esi
push   [ebp+arg_4]
push   edi
call   sub_314623
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz     short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push   0Dh
call   sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call   sub_3140F3
test   eax, eax
jg     short loc_31307D
call   sub_3140F3
jmp    short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call   sub_3140F3
and    eax, 0FFFFh
or     eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
```

OpenBSD – “secure by default”

- Good code is inherently secure
 - Fewer bugs
 - Utilizes secure coding practices
- Extensive code review and audits
- Reduces attack surface by disabling most remote services in default install

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
xor eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
; -----
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

```

push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea    eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F

```

```

loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+59

```

```

push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B

```

```

loc_313067:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49

```

```

call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C

```

```

loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```

```

call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h

```

```

loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```

```

mov     [ebp+var_4], eax

```

FEWER BUGS != MORE SECURE

One bug is still enough to blow things wide open

Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux)



“SELinux is an implementation of mandatory access controls (MAC) on Linux. Mandatory access controls allow an administrator of a system to define how applications and users can access different resources such as files, devices, networks and inter-process communication.”

–selinuxproject.org

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+arg_7]
mov eax, [ebp+arg_5]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
loc_313066:
push esi
call sub_31411B
loc_313074:
call sub_3140F3
mov eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
; -----
loc_31307D:
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
loc_31308C:
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

SELinux – Overview

- Open sourced by the NSA in 2000
- Extended filesystem permissions controls
 - Users and services should only have access to exactly what they need

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
test    eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Grsecurity (GRSEC)



“Grsecurity is an extensive security enhancement to the Linux kernel that defends against a wide range of security threats through intelligent access control, memory corruption-based exploit prevention, and a host of other system hardening that generally require no configuration ...”

–grsecurity.net

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
```

```
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
push ebx
call sub_31411B
loc_313071: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
mov sub_3140F3, eax
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
; -----
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

GRSEC – Overview

- Started in 2001 as a port of [OpenWall](#)
- Free, relatively easy to setup
- Besides robust access control like SELinux, GRSEC has a large focus on hardening against memory corruption based exploits

– High quality PAX ASLR, Memory Sanitization, Heap Hardening, Active Response, to name a few

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+var_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 0Dh
call sub_3144F3
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Lecture Overview

- Secure Systems & Patch Sets
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 - SELinux
 - Grsecurity
- Owning Game Consoles
 - Xbox 360
 - Nintendo 3DS
 - PS3
- Current Generation

```
push    edi
call   sub_314623
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz   short loc_313066
mov    eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp    eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb     short loc_313066
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]
push   esi
push   esi
push   eax
push   edi
mov    [ebp+arg_0], eax
call   sub_31486A
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
push   esi
lea   eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push   eax
mov    esi, 1D0h
push   esi
push   [ebp+arg_4]
push   edi
call   sub_314623
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz     short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push   0Dh
call   sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call   sub_3140F3
test   eax, eax
jg     short loc_31307D
call   sub_3140F3
jmp    short loc_31308C
```

```
-----
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call   sub_3140F3
and    eax, 0FFFFh
or     eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
```

GAME CONSOLES

A closer look at the bugs that brought down consoles of our generation

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F

loc_313066:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                           ; sub_312FD8+59
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B

loc_31306D:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                           ; sub_312FD8+49
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C

; -----
loc_31307D:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h

loc_31308C:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Game Consoles

- Evolving entertainment platforms
 - Play games, stream media, browse the web
- 100% consistent machine for developers
 - Don't have to account for different specs (eg. PC's)
- Enforces DRM much better than PC's can
 - It's a controlled platform that only runs code as blessed by Sony, Microsoft, Nintendo

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
```

```
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_313066
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

Xbox 360 – Nov. 2005



```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Xbox 360 – Nov. 2005

- Security Perspective

- Only runs signed code or executables
- Rigorous chain of trust, secure bootstrapping
- Encrypted runtime memory
- eFuses to enforce updates (these are awesome)
- NX/DEP
- No ASLR

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 100h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
ja short loc_31306E
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
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```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
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```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

```

push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F

```

```

loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+59

```

```

push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B

```

```

loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49

```

```

call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C

```

```

; -----

```

```

loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```

```

call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h

```

```

loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```

```

mov     [ebp+var_4], eax

```

KING KONG EXPLOIT

updates don't always patch bugs, sometimes they introduce them

King Kong Exploit – Dec. 2006

- Privilege escalation bug, resulting in code execution at the Hypervisor context
 - Complete system control
- The bug leveraged by the King Kong Exploit was **INTRODUCED** in kernel version 4532, and patched two updates later in v4552
 - For reference, the Xbox 360 shipped on v1888

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_31306A: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 0Fh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F0
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```


```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

About the Xbox 360 & Games

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
```

- All executables (.XEX's) are **signed** by Microsoft which the system verifies to prevent tampering with code
- Data assets such as textures, models, shaders, and audio as used by games are **NOT** signed!
 - Find bugs in game asset parsers



```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```


```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Stage One: King Kong's Role

- A maliciously crafted **unsigned** shader file parsed by the **signed** King Kong game XEX, can lead to unprivileged code execution on the system
- King Kong was one of many possible memory corruption vectors that could have been used to get basic code exec



```
call sub_3140F3
and  eax, 0FFFFFFh
or   eax, 80070000h
```


loc_31308C:

```
mov  [ebp+var_4], eax
```

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

About the Xbox 360 Hypervisor

- A small Hypervisor (Hv) sits next to the kernel, near the top of memory
- The Hv handles some crypto keys, low level IO, memory encryption/decryption operations and more
- If you can take over the Hv, you have access to phymem and the highest privilege of execution



Stage Two: Hyper Escalation

- The PPC instruction 'sc' is used to make system calls on the Xbox 360, the Hv handles these calls as they are made
- Unfortunately, along came a bug in the syscall handler):

random ppc ----->

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
----- SUBROUTINE -----
xt:826B9AF8 # int __cdecl SleepEx(int intervalMs, int alertable)
xt:826B9AF8 SleepEx: # CODE XREF: sub_826B2EA0+10fp
xt:826B9AF8 # sub_826B2ED8+4tj
xt:826B9AF8 .set intervalNs, -0x30
xt:826B9AF8 mfspr %r12, LR
xt:826B9AFC bl _savegprlr_29
xt:826B9B00 stwu %sp, -0x80(%sp)
xt:826B9B04 mr %r29, %r4
xt:826B9B08 cmpwi cr6, %r3, -1 # INFINITE
xt:826B9B0C bne cr6, convert_ms_to_ns
xt:826B9B10 li %r11, 0 # -1 -> 0 for KeDelayExecutionT
xt:826B9B14 b valid_value
-----
xt:826B9B18 # -----
xt:826B9B18 convert_ms_to_ns: # CODE XREF: SleepEx+14tj
xt:826B9B18 rldicl %r10, %r3, 0,32 # ms to units of 100ns
xt:826B9B1C addi %r11, %sp, 0x80+intervalNs
xt:826B9B20 mulli %r10, %r10, -0x2710
xt:826B9B24 std %r10, 0x80+intervalNs(%sp)
xt:826B9B28 valid_value: # CODE XREF: SleepEx+1Ctj
xt:826B9B28 mr %r30, %r11
xt:826B9B2C cmplwi cr6, %r11, 0
xt:826B9B30 bne cr6, loc_826B9B44 # if intervalMs=0, skip
xt:826B9B34 stw %r11, 0x80+intervalNs+4(%sp)
xt:826B9B38 lis %r11, -0x8000 # set msb=1 for relative time
xt:826B9B3C addi %r30, %sp, 0x80+intervalNs
xt:826B9B40 stw %r11, 0x80+intervalNs(%sp)
xt:826B9B44 loc_826B9B44: # CODE XREF: SleepEx+38tj
xt:826B9B44 clrldi %r31, %r29, 24
xt:826B9B48 delay_loop: # CODE XREF: SleepEx+6Ctj
xt:826B9B48 mr %r5, %r30 # interval
xt:826B9B4C mr %r4, %r29 # alertable
xt:826B9B50 li %r3, 1 # waitMode
xt:826B9B54 bl KeDelayExecutionThread
xt:826B9B58 cmplwi cr6, %r31, 0
xt:826B9B5C beq cr6, successful
xt:826B9B60 cmpwi cr6, %r3, 0x101 # STATUS_ALERTED
xt:826B9B64 beq cr6, delay_loop
xt:826B9B68 successful: # CODE XREF: SleepEx+44tj
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
-----
loc_31308C:
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Pseudocode of the Hv Bug

```
int syscall_handler(uint64_t syscall_num, ...)
{
    /* check for invalid syscall */
    if((uint32_t)syscall_num > 0x61)
        return 0;

    /* call the respective syscall func */
    syscall_table[syscall_num](...);
    ...
}
```

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jnb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 00h
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```


```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

The Oops

- Only the lower 32 bits of the syscall number are sanity checked
- The whole 64 bit number is used in address calculation

`syscall_table[syscall_num](...);`
Just jump to userland memory/code



Game Over

```
SATA device at ea001300
* Serial:      WD-WXB1AA1W1246
* Firmware: 01.01A01
* Model: WDC WD10JPVT-00A1YT0
* Addressing mode: Z
* #cylinders: 16383
* #heads: 16
* #sectors: 1953525168
registered new device: sda
* trying to make sense of sda, let's assume it's fat
* sata dvd init
SATA device at ea001200
ATAPI inquiry model: PLDS   DG-16D2S
registered new device: dvd
* trying to make sense of dvd, let's assume it's iso9660
* CPU PUR: 00710B00
* FUSES - write them down and keep them safe:
fuseset 00: c0ffffffffffffff
fuseset 01: 0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f
fuseset 02: f000000000000000
fuseset 03: 26d9359992639642
fuseset 04: 26d9359992639642
fuseset 05: 151dfea8df5c5cc4
fuseset 06: 151dfea8df5c5cc4
fuseset 07: f000000000000000
fuseset 08: 0000000000000000
fuseset 09: 0000000000000000
fuseset 10: 0000000000000000
fuseset 11: 0000000000000000

* your cpu key: 26D9359992639642151DFEA8DF5C5CC4
* your dvd key: 30615DB9B4C26B443CD1CBA5FC005F60

* network config: 192.168.1.99 / 255.255.255.0
MAC: 7CED8DABBE4E

* Looking for xenon.elf or vmlinux on USB/CD/DVD or user-defined file via TFTP...
Trying uda:/vmlinux...
```

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
```

eax

306D

g_0]

306D

esi

308F

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49

307D

308C

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

```

push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F

```

```

loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+59

```

```

push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B

```

```

loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49

```

```

call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C

```

```

loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```

```

call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h

```

```

loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```

```

mov     [ebp+var_4], eax

```

XBOX 360 HARDWARE ATTACKS

Straying from binary exploitation, but still interesting

SMC / JTAG Hack – 2007-2009

- Uses the SMC and JTAG to trigger a DMA overwrite instantly at bootup rather than having to load a game such a King Kong
- Cat and mouse for a few years, allowing hackers to boot into downgraded, exploitable kernels (eg v4532)
- Eventually Patched by MS when they decided to rework the boot process from the 2BL and up

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_4], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jnz short loc_31306F
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306F
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_31306E: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8 ; sub_312FD8+55
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8 ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
sub short loc_31308C
```


```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

SMC / JTAG Hack

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
```



CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
sub_312FD8+55

CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
sub_312FD8+49

CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Reset Glitch Hack (RGH) – Aug. 2011

- In the 2bl there's some hash checks that expect a 0 to be returned for a good hash, or 1 for a hash mismatch (fail)
- Sending a specific reset signal down a pin on the CPU clears the CPU registers
- Reset the registers as the hash check returns

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push esi
mov [ebp+var_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

loc_313066:

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

loc_31306D:

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jz short loc_31308F
```


loc_31307D:

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

loc_31308C:

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Xbox 360 Reset Glitch Hack (RGH)



```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jnb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
eax
edi
[ebp+arg_0], eax
sub_31486A
eax, eax
short loc_31306D
esi
eax, [ebp+arg_0]
eax
esi, 1D0h
esi
[ebp+arg_4]
edi
sub_314623
eax, eax
short loc_31306D
[ebp+arg_0], esi
short loc_31308F
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
0Dh
sub_31411B
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
sub_3140F3
eax, eax
short loc_31307D
sub_3140F3
short loc_31308C
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

Nintendo 3DS - Feb. 2011



```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+59
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Nintendo 3DS - Feb. 2011

- Security Perspective

- Very tightly sealed bootrom, hardware disabled
- Only runs signed code or executables
- Hardware based keyscrambler for crypto keys
- NX/DEP (Only on the ARM11 AppCore)
- Runtime memory is not encrypted
- No eFuses
- No ASLR

```
edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```



```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Nintendo 3DS Architecture

```

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
inz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
    
```



Nintendo 3DS Architecture

- **AppCore** (ARM11) – ‘high level’
 - Runs your games, apps, anything visual
- **SysCore** (ARM9) – ‘low level’
 - Crypto, system IO, talks to hardware, like a Hypervisor
- **PXI**
 - Pipeline for the cores to talk to each other

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

```

push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F

```

```

loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+59

```

```

push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B

```

```

loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49

```

```

call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C

```

```

loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```

```

call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h

```

```

loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```

```

mov     [ebp+var_4], eax

```

PWNING OVER THE PXI

Owning the SysCore through the PXI

VerifyRsaSha256() – Jun. 2013

- Privilege escalation bug, resulting in code execution on the **SysCore (ARM9)**
 - Complete system control
- Present from firmware version 1.0.0 – 4.5.0
- Discovered only when Nintendo patched it

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31306F
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
; -----
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Stage One: ARM11 Code Exec

- A stack smash exists in the DS Profile fields in the native settings application on all 3DS's at the time. No need for any games!
- This is a straight stack smash that will get us control, but there is **DEP** on the **ARM11** so you must **ROP**

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
rpb [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
```

Which setting do you want to change?



b 312FD8
b 312FD8

```
js short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```


```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

State of Control

```

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
    
```



We have at least basic code exec through ROP on the ARM11

A ROP chain diagram showing the execution flow from the SysCore. Red arrows originate from the **loc_313066** instruction in the SysCore and point to four targets:

- loc_31306D**: Points to a Toshiba TC58NVG0S3AFT 1Gb NAND SLC memory chip.
- loc_3140F3**: Points to a SanDisk 16 GB SD card.
- loc_31308C**: Points to a Wi-Fi signal icon.
- loc_3140F3**: Points to a keyboard icon with keys X, Y, A, and B.

 The diagram also includes assembly code snippets for the SysCore:


```

loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8 ; sub_312FD8+55
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B

loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8 ; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
short loc_313070
short loc_3140F3
short loc_31308C



loc_3140F3: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h

loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
    
```

Normal PXI Requests

```



push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
    
```



Normal PXI Requests

```



push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
    
```



Normal PXI Requests

```

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
    
```



TAKING OVER THE ARM9

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+59
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```


```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Malicious PXI Requests

```

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
    
```




We have at least basic code exec through ROP on the ARM11

This diagram shows a ROP chain on the ARM9 processor. Red arrows indicate the flow of execution from assembly code to various hardware and software components: a Toshiba NAND chip, a SanDisk 16GB SD card, a Wi-Fi symbol, and a keyboard. A text box contains the characters 'X', 'Y', 'A', and 'B'. The assembly code includes instructions like `push 0Dh`, `call sub_31411B`, `call sub_3140F3`, and `and eax, 0FFFFFFh`.

Malicious PXI Requests

```

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
    
```



Exploit **PXI** handlers on the **ARM9** side!

We have at least basic code exec through **ROP** on the **ARM11**

The diagram shows four exploit targets: a **TOSHIBA TC58NVG0S3AFT 1Gb NAND SLC** memory chip, a **SanDisk 16 GB SD** card, a **Wi-Fi** signal, and a keyboard with keys **X**, **Y**, **A**, and **B**. Red arrows point from the SysCore to these targets, indicating the execution of ROP chains. The background contains assembly code snippets:

```

loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8 ; sub_312FD8+55
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B

loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8 ; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
short loc_31307
short 3140F3
short 31308C

loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h

loc_31308C: mov [ebp+var_4], eax
    
```

Pseudocode of the ARM9 Bug

```
int ps_VerifyRsaSha256(RSA_SIG * sig)
```

```
{
```

```
    RSA_SIG localsig; // 0x208 byte sig object on stack  
    memset(localsig, 0, sizeof(RSA_SIG));
```

```
    /* copy the RSA signature into a local sig object */  
    memcpy(localsig.sigbuf, sig->sigbuf, sig->sigsize);
```

```
    ...
```

```
    return result;
```

```
}
```

```
push    edi  
call    sub_314623  
test    eax, eax  
jz      short loc_31306D  
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx  
jnz     short loc_313066  
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]  
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]  
jb      short loc_313066  
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]  
push    esi
```

```
push    esi  
push    eax  
push    edi  
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax  
call    sub_31486A  
test    eax, eax  
jz      short loc_31306D
```

```
push    esi  
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]  
push    eax  
mov     esi, 1D0h  
push    esi  
push    [ebp+arg_4]  
push    edi
```

```
call    sub_314623  
test    eax, eax  
jz      short loc_31306D  
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi  
jz      short loc_31308F  
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8  
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh  
call    sub_31411B  
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8  
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3  
test    eax, eax  
jg      short loc_31307D  
call    sub_3140F3  
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
-----  
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3  
and     eax, 0FFFFh  
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Pseudocode of the ARM9 Bug

```
int ps_VerifyRsaSha256(RSA_SIG * sig)
```

```
{
```

```
    RSA_SIG localsig; // 0x208 byte sig object on stack  
    memset(localsig, 0, sizeof(RSA_SIG));
```

```
    /* copy the RSA signature into a local sig object */  
    memcpy(localsig.sigbuf, sig->sigbuf, sig->sigsize);
```

```
    ...
```

```
    return result;
```

```
}
```

```
push    edi  
call   sub_314623  
test   eax, eax  
jz     short loc_31306D  
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx  
jnz   short loc_313066  
mov    eax, [ebp+var_70]  
cmp    eax, [ebp+var_84]  
jb     short loc_313066  
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]  
push   esi
```

```
push   esi  
push   eax  
push   edi  
mov    [ebp+arg_0], eax  
call   sub_31486A  
test   eax, eax  
jz     short loc_31306D  
push   esi
```

```
lea    eax, [ebp+arg_0]  
push   eax  
mov    esi, 1D0h
```

```
push   esi  
push   [ebp+arg_4]  
push   edi  
call   sub_314623  
test   eax, eax
```

```
jz     short loc_31306D  
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], esi  
jz     short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8  
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push   0Dh  
call   sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306F: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8  
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call   sub_3140F3  
test   eax, eax  
jg     short loc_31307D  
call   sub_3140F3  
jmp    short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call   sub_3140F3  
and    eax, 0FFFFFFh  
or     eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Attacker Controlled Data

VerifyRsaSha256() – Jun. 2013


- Bug is basically a memcpy with user controlled data, and a user specified size
- **No DEP or ASLR on the ARM9**, simply overwrite return address and jump onto your buffer! (:
- With control of the **ARM9** you can do anything
 - Load a custom firmware & soft reboot the system

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
inc ebx
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_313066
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jg short loc_313066
; -----
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

```

push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]

```



GAME OVER

```

j_0], eax
:6A
[
]c_31306D
]p+arg_0]
]h
j_4]
:23
[
]c_31306D
j_0], esi
]c_31308F

```

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55

l1B

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49

)F3

```

jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C

```

loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```

call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h

```

loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```

mov     [ebp+var_4], eax

```

Owning the 3DS

- Code exec on the **AppCore (ARM11)** is **easy**
 - Tons of crappy vulnerable games everywhere, less exciting exploits exist to do this
- Owning the **SysCore (ARM9)** is much harder
 - Limited attack surface with little user input
 - Owning the **ARM9** is what separates the boys from the men

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], esi
call sub_31466A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push [ebp+arg_0]
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 07h
call sub_31461B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_314055
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

PlayStation 3 – Nov. 2006



```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
3066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+59
```

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

PlayStation 3 – Nov. 2006

- Security Perspective

- FreeBSD Based OS
- Only runs signed code or executables
- Rigorous chain of trust, secure bootstrapping
- Cell Architecture
 - Isolates cores from each other, HV
 - Dedicated System / Security Cell
- Encrypted runtime memory
- Encrypted HDD
- eFuses
- NX/DEP
- No ASLR

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```


```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Cell Broadband Engine Processor



```

edi
sub_314623
eax, eax
short loc_31306D
[ebp+arg_0], ebx
short loc_313066
eax, [ebp+var_70]
eax, [ebp+var_84]
short loc_313066
eax, [ebp+var_84]
esi
esi
eax
edi
[ebp+arg_0], eax
sub_31486A
eax, eax
short loc_31306D
esi
eax, [ebp+arg_0]
eax
esi, 1D0h
esi
[ebp+arg_4]
edi
sub_314623
eax, eax
short loc_31306D
[ebp+arg_0], esi
short loc_31308F
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
0Dh
sub_31411B
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
sub_3140F3
eax, eax
short loc_31307D
sub_3140F3
short loc_31308C

```

```

loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h

```

```

loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax

```

```

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D

```

Chain of Trust

Name	Processor / Mode	updateable	revocable*	usage
bootldr	SPE	✗	✗	boot lv0
lv0	PPE HV	✓	✗	boot lv1
metldr	SPE	✗	✗	run *ldr
lv1ldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt lv1
lv1	PPE HV	✓	✗	hypervisor
isoldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt modules
sc_iso	SPE	✓	✓	
...				
lv2ldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt lv2
lv2	PPE SV	✓	✓	kernel
appldr	SPE	✓	✓	decrypt games
some game	PPE PS	✓	✓	:-)

*as per Sony's specification

```

DE XREF: sub_312FD8
b_312FD8+55

```

```

DE XREF: sub_312FD8
b_312FD8+49

```

Mittwoch, 29. Dezember 2010

```

loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```

```

call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h

```

```

loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```

```

mov [ebp+var 4], eax

```

GeoHot Owns PS3 Hv – Jan. 2010

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
```

- Through OtherOS (Linux on PS3) and chip glitching, GeoHot owns the PS3 Hypervisor
- Glitching 'creates' a use after free scenario in the Hypervisor that is then exploited to get code exec
- Dumps of PS3 HV & kernel make their way public



```
EF: sub_312FD8
FD8+55
EF: sub_312FD8
FD8+49
EF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

```

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D

```

Chain of Trust

Name	Processor / Mode	updateable	revocable*	usage
bootldr	SPE	✗	✗	boot lv0
lv0	PPE HV	✓	✗	boot lv1
metldr	SPE	✗	✗	run *ldr
lv1ldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt lv1
lv1	PPE HV	✓	✗	hypervisor
isoldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt modules
sc_iso	SPE	✓	✓	
...				
lv2ldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt lv2
lv2	PPE SV	✓	✓	kernel
apldr	SPE	✓	✓	decrypt games
some game	PPE PS	✓	✓	:-)



*as per Sony's specification

Mittwoch, 29. Dezember 2010

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```

call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h


```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var 4], eax
```

Sony Disables OtherOS - Mar. 2010

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_0]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
```



1306D

arg_0]

1306D

, esi

1308F

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+59

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49

1307D

1308C

loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

PS3 Jailbreak – Aug. 2010

- With the PS3 Kernel (LV2) dumped, a heap overflow found in USB handling during startup while the system searches for a service jig
- The main bug is an overflow in long device descriptors that leads to memory corruption on the heap
- Results in control of the LV2

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
push esi
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8 ; sub_312FD8+55
push 0
call sub_31411B

loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8 ; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C

loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h

loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

PS3 Jailbreak – Aug. 2010

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
```



```
eax
306D
g_0]
```

```
306D
esi
308F
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
307D
```

```
308C
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

PS3 Jailbreak – Aug. 2010

- Heap overflow setup and triggered through a USB hub (oops) and six USB's
- It's a bit like musical chairs, plugging and unplugging a number of USB's to malloc/free stuff – everyone just emulates this process with a single USB

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], ebx
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push ebx
call sub_31411b
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

```

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D

```

Chain of Trust

Name	Processor / Mode	updateable	revocable*	usage
bootldr	SPE	✗	✗	boot lv0
lv0	PPE HV	✓	✗	boot lv1
metldr	SPE	✗	✗	run *ldr
lv1ldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt lv1
lv1	PPE HV	✓	✗	hypervisor
isoldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt modules
sc_iso	SPE	✓	✓	
...				
lv2ldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt lv2
lv2	PPE SV	✓	✓	kernel
apldr	SPE	✓	✓	decrypt games
some game	PPE PS	✓	✓	:-)

PS3 Jailbreak →



*as per Sony's specification

Mittwoch, 29. Dezember 2010

```

loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h

loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var 4], eax

```

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+59
```

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_313070: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```


PS3 ECDSA KEY EXTRACTION

Largest console break of this generation stems from crypto flaw

PS3 ECDSA Key Extraction – Jan. 2011

- Executables running on the PS3 are modified ELF's known as SELF's
- Signed by Sony's **ECDSA** Key, encrypted by the associated Lv(0,1,2) keys
 - Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

ELF



```

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
--

```

```

call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
; -----
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax

```

PS3 ECDSA Key Extraction – Jan. 2011

- With control of the LV2, you can make crypto requests to the security SPE and use it as a black box
- An egregious crypto implementation flaw is uncovered by fail0verflow regarding Sony's ECDSA signatures

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31466A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
shl esi, 31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 0
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
; -----
```



```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Elliptic Curve Cryptography



these might look familiar

```

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jg short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov [ebp+arg_4], eax
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
short loc_31308F
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
fill sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
; -----
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
    
```

Const Instead of Nonce

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
```

A signature is a pair of numbers R, S computed by the signer as

$$R = (mG)_x$$

$$S = \frac{e + kR}{m}.$$

It is imperative to have a random m for every signature: from a pair of signatures that use the same m , we can compute m and k .

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Const Instead of Nonce

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
```

$$R = (mG)_x \quad R = (mG)_x$$
$$S_1 = \frac{e_1 + kR}{m} \quad S_2 = \frac{e_2 + kR}{m}$$

When m is identical for two signatures, so is R ,
and

$$S_1 - S_2 = \frac{e_1 - e_2}{m}$$

$$m = \frac{e_1 - e_2}{S_1 - S_2}$$

$$k = \frac{mS_i - e_i}{R} \quad \left[= \frac{e_1S_2 - e_2S_1}{R(S_1 - S_2)} \right].$$

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Effects of Missteps

- With only TWO signatures from the Crypto SPE, you can compute Sony's Private ECDSA Key
- With the ECDSA Key, the floodgates are opened
 - You can sign anything as Sony
 - This key is embedded in hardware

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push esi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31484A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
mov eax, eax
jz short loc_313066
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

loc_313066:

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

loc_31306D:

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

loc_31307D:

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```


loc_31308C:

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

metldr Owned

- Geohot releases metldr decryption keys



```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
loc_313066:
mov [ebp+var_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
```

CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
sub_312FD8+55

CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
sub_312FD8+49

loc_31307D: CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D

```

Chain of Trust

Name	Processor / Mode	updateable	revocable*	usage
bootldr	SPE	✗	✗	boot lv0
lv0	PPE HV	✓	✗	boot lv1
metldr	SPE	✗	✗	run *ldr
lv1ldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt lv1
lv1	PPE HV	✓	✗	hypervisor
isoldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt modules
sc_iso	SPE	✓	✓	
...				
lv2ldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt lv2
lv2	PPE SV	✓	✓	kernel
apldr	SPE	✓	✓	decrypt games
some game	PPE PS	✓	✓	:-)



*as per Sony's specification

Mittwoch, 29. Dezember 2010

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```


call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h

```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var 4], eax
```

Sony Nukes metldr



```

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push edi

```

```

[ebp+arg_0], eax
sub_31486A
eax, eax
short loc_31306D
esi
eax, [ebp+arg_0]
eax
esi, 1D0h
esi
[ebp+arg_4]
edi
sub_314623
eax, eax
short loc_31306D
[ebp+arg_0], esi
short loc_31308F

```

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55

```

0Dh
sub_31411B

```

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49

```

sub_3140F3
eax, eax
short loc_31307D
sub_3140F3
short loc_31308C

```

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```

call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h

```

```

mov [ebp+var_4], eax

```

Sony Sues Geohot – Jan. 2011

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
```



```
    ], eax
    5A
    :_31306D
    >arg_0]
    1
    _4]
    23
    :_31306D
    _0], esi
    :_31308F
    ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
    ; sub_312FD8+55
    .B
    ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
    ; sub_312FD8+49
    73
    :_31307D
    73
    :_31308C
    ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

```

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D

```

Chain of Trust

Name	Processor / Mode	updateable	revocable*	usage
bootldr	SPE	✗	✗	boot lv0
lv0	PPE HV	✓	✗	boot lv1
metldr	SPE	✗	✗	run *ldr
lv1ldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt lv1
lv1	PPE HV	✓	✗	hypervisor
isoldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt modules
sc_iso	SPE	✓	✓	
...				
lv2ldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt lv2
lv2	PPE SV	✓	✓	kernel
apldr	SPE	✓	✓	decrypt games
some game	PPE PS	✓	✓	:-)



*as per Sony's specification

Mittwoch, 29. Dezember 2010

```

loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h

loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var 4], eax

```

Owning the Iv0

- metldr is gone, so you need to own the Iv0
- Iv0 blobs can be signed, but they're encrypted and we don't have the keys to decrypt them
- What do you do?????

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Owning the Iv0

- metldr is gone, so you need to own the Iv0
- Iv0 blobs can be signed, but they're encrypted and we don't have the keys to decrypt them

- What do you do?????

– Sign random data blobs, and hope the instruction at the entry point 'decrypt' to a jmp/call to code that you control

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_314010
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_313080
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Iv0 Owned – Oct. 2012

- Trying randomly signed blobs eventually works and execution is achieved at level of Iv0

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31487A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F

loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B

loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
; -----
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h

loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

```

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D

```

Chain of Trust

Name	Processor / Mode	updateable	revocable*	usage
bootldr	SPE	✗	✗	boot lv0
lv0	PPE HV	✓	✗	boot lv1
metldr	SPE	✗	✗	run *ldr
lv1ldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt lv1
lv1	PPE HV	✓	✗	hypervisor
isoldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt modules
sc_iso	SPE	✓	✓	
...				
lv2ldr	SPE	✓	✗	decrypt lv2
lv2	PPE SV	✓	✓	kernel
appldr	SPE	✓	✓	decrypt games
some game	PPE PS	✓	✓	:-)



*as per Sony's specification

Mittwoch, 29. Dezember 2010

```

loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h

loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var 4], eax

```

Iv0 Owned – Oct. 2012

- Decryption keys are retrieved as Iv0. Now you can create meaningful Iv0 blobs, encrypt them, and sign them
- bootldr also exploited and dumped for fun
 - Not updateable anyway, so it doesn't matter much

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_1], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jnz short loc_313066
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
push esi
call sub_31441D
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
; -----
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```



```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
```

```
5A
: 31306D
+arg_0]
1
.4]
23
: 31306D
0], esi
: 31308F
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+59
```

```
.B
```

```
loc_31306D:
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

PS3 Aftermath

- Sony drops lawsuit against Geohot
 - Must never hack Sony products again
- No more updateable seeds of trust exist on the PS3 that Sony can utilize
 - PS3 totally broken

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Lecture Overview

- Secure Systems & Patch Sets
 - OpenBSD
 - SELinux
 - Grsecurity
- Owning Game Consoles
 - Xbox 360
 - Nintendo 3DS
 - PS3
- Current Generation

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

CURRENT GENERATION

A peek at the current generation of consoles

```
push    edi
call   sub_314623
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz   short loc_313066
mov    eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp    eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb     short loc_313066
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]
push   esi
push   esi
push   eax
push   edi
mov    [ebp+arg_0], eax
call   sub_31486A
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
push   esi
lea   eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push   eax
mov    esi, 1D0h
push   esi
push   [ebp+arg_4]
push   edi
call   sub_314623
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz     short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+59
```

```
push   0Dh
call   sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call   sub_3140F3
test   eax, eax
jg     short loc_31307D
call   sub_3140F3
jmp    short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call   sub_3140F3
and    eax, 0FFFFh
or     eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Current Generation

- Xbox One

 - I did some reversing over winter break (-:

- PS4

 - I don't know as much about, sorry):

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Xbox One – Nov. 2013

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
```



```
[_0], eax
6A
c_31306D
p+arg_0]
h
_4]
23
c_31306D
_0], esi
c_31308F
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+59
```

```
1B
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
F3
```

```
c_31307D
```

```
F3
```

```
c_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Xbox One OS

- Ditches the 360's custom operating system
 - Xbox OS (XOS) is forked from Windows 8(ish)
- Spins up minimal windows VM instances to run your games, apps, etc

- Windows 8/8.1 core OS bugs likely apply!

```
push    edi
call   sub_314623
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz   short loc_313066
mov    eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp    eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb     short loc_313066
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]
push   esi
push   esi
push   eax
push   edi
call   sub_31486A
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
lea   eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push  eax
mov   esi, 1D0h
push  esi
push  [ebp+arg_4]
push  edi
call  sub_31486A
test  eax, eax
jz   short loc_31306D
cmp  [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz   short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                             ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call   sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                             ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call   sub_3140F3
test   eax, eax
jg     short loc_31307D
call   sub_3140F3
jmp    short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call   sub_3140F3
and    eax, 0FFFFh
or     eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Xbox Virtual Disks

- Starting out, most things are in AES128 encrypted containers known as XVDs & XVCs
- Just like an encrypted virtual disk or zip, contains .exe's, assets, directory structure, etc
- A lot of the security elements of the 360's .XEX's were inherited by the XVDs/XVCs

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306F
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
cmp [ebp+var_4], eax
jz short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Xbox One PSP

- AMD snuck an ARM Platform Security Processor into the Xbox One CPU
- ? This was never formally announced?
 - AMD only ever announced they were working on this technology, not that it was released.....

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

```
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
push 0h
call sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Xbox One PSP

- Nobody can decrypt system files, updates, without the 'green' AES256 ODK
- Host OS queries the PSP for the green AES256 ODK key, PSP passes it to the Host OS for XVD decryption

– It would be nice to get this key)-:

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push esi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314123
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_313066
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
; -----
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Xbox One Host OS

- Owning the system means owning the Host OS
- You can't effectively comb the Host OS for bugs if you can't decrypt its system files
- You need to own the Host OS to get access to the keys used to decrypt it
 - Chicken & the egg problem

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+var_10], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push ADh
call sub_314155
```

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

PS4 - Nov. 2013

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
```



31306D

arg_0]

31306D

], esi

31308F

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+59

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49

31307D

31308C

loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```

PS4 Details

- I really don't know as much about the PS4 OS or its security features
- I do know that it has a very similar AMD CPU as the Xbox One

– An ARM PSP is also present in the CPU

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz     short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb      short loc_313066
sub     eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz      short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz      short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+55
```

```
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
```

```
loc_31306D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                                                ; sub_312FD8+49
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg      short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp     short loc_31308C
```

```
loc_31307D:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
call    sub_3140F3
and     eax, 0FFFFh
or      eax, 80070000h
```

```
loc_31308C:                                     ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

```
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
```

References, Readings, Talks

- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=82vf0JQS1Sk>
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- <http://3dbrew.org/>

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
xor eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

loc_313066:

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55

```
push 0Dh
call sub_31411B
```

loc_31306D:

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49

```
call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

loc_31307D:

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

loc_31308C:

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

```
mov [ebp+var_4], eax
```